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Abstract: The trend towards demand-driven agricultural research, which should lead to higher impact 
in terms of the contribution of research to agricultural innovation at both farm and agri-chain level,  has 
focused attention to the inclusion of farmers in the process of research planning i.e. the generation of 
research queries, the prioritization of these, and decision making upon resource allocation. 
Theoretically this would be the ‘maximum degree of participation’ as outlined in many  so-called 
participation ladders, and should enhance ownership and increase the applicability of research. 
However, in practice several tensions emerge with regard to the operationalization of such ‘user-
driven research planning systems’. The paper analyzes such tensions, by focussing on two systems in 
which user driven research planning is operationalized. One is a system of research funded with levies 
paid by farmers (i.e. private collective funds) and the other is a system in which government has 
delegated the planning of research to a multi-stakeholder network constituted by actors from the agri-
food chain, researchers and consultants (i.e. using public funds). Taking an innovation systems 
perspective, with a strong focus on institutional aspects (i.e. norms, values, incentive mechanisms, 
reward mechanisms) and linkages between actors, the paper identifies several tensions in such 
system of 'demand-driven' research planning. While the systems have different approaches, the 
tensions are quite similar. These tensions deal with the different and often limited perspectives on 
innovation of the actors involved, different and sometimes conflicting progress monitoring and output 
evaluation criteria, and information assymetries between the actor groups which influence there 
capacity to succesfully act in the research planning system.  The analysis prompts the importance of 
synchronizing perspectives on innovation, and capacity building among all actors active on such 
demand-driven research planning platforms to enable them to succesfully operate on these platforms. 
Keywords: demand-driven research, research planning, The Netherlands, innovation systems 
Introduction 
Changes in the agricultural knowledge infrastructure 
Over time, major changes have taken place in the relationships between end-users of knowledge (i.e. 
farmers) and the agricultural knowledge infrastructure. In the context of agriculture the term knowledge 
infrastructure has been often used to indicate the whole of agricultural research, extension and 
education establishments. These relationships have changed because of shortcomings of previous 
innovation support systems for farmers (based on linear, ‘science push’ models of innovation) that 
have been criticized in the broad literature on participatory research and extension (Sperling and 
Ashby, 2001), and because of the development of network and systems approaches to agricultural 
innovation such as the agricultural knowledge and information systems approach (AKIS, Röling and 
Engel, 1991), and the agricultural innovation systems approach (AIS, Hall et al., 2006). With regard to 
conceptual development, Hall et al. (2006) speak about a transition from national agricultural research 
systems (NARS) to agricultural knowledge and information systems (AKIS), to agricultural innovation 
systems (AIS). From the AIS perspective, the agricultural knowledge infrastructure forms part of such 
an agricultural innovation system, but is not necessarily the principal driver as Hall et al. (2006: vii) 
emphasize:  “The innovation systems concept embraces not only the science suppliers but the totality 
and interaction of actors involved in innovation. It extends beyond the creation of knowledge to 
encompass the factors affecting demand for and use of knowledge in novel and useful ways”. The 
agricultural innovation systems approach also focuses on enabling and constraining factors for 
innovation other than knowledge, such as physical ‘hard’ infrastructure and social ‘soft’ infrastructure, 
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including institutions such as informal norms, values, attitudes and practices, and formal rules 
embedded in legislation and policy (Hall et al., 2006; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
While recognizing the need to take a broad view on innovation, the paper focuses on the interface 
between end-users (farmers and agri-industry) and research. A number of recent changes have 
affected this interface. A shift from homogenous production to diversification of products and 
specialization of producers has resulted in “dispersion of professional interests and aptitudes” 
(Janssen and Braunschweig, 2003), which affects the interface between the users and producers of 
knowledge (Smits, 2002).  Agriculture is also becoming increasingly knowledge intensive (Hall et al., 
2006). Furthermore, privatization of the public agricultural knowledge infrastructure has taken place 
(Leeuwis, 2000; Byerlee et al., 2002). As a result, a market in agricultural research and extension 
services has emerged for the support of agricultural innovation processes.  
The shift to such a market for ‘innovation support services’ has created new roles for parties on both 
the demand side (e.g. farmers, funding bodies such as government) and the supply side (providers of 
research and extension) in respect of employing alternative funding and incentive mechanisms. In the 
literature much attention has been paid to the potentially positive and/or negative effects of alternative 
systems of funding and provisioning of agricultural research and extension, in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability, and content. The present thinking is that provisioning of research and 
extension should be pluralistic with mixed funding and undertaken by both public and private parties 
(Byerlee et al., 2002; Rivera et al., 2005). A key issue in this discussion is the premise that separating 
funding from provisioning of research and extension would make service provision demand-driven.  
Because in a market setting services are contracted, and several providers compete for contracts, this 
would enhance provider performance and orientation towards clients’ wishes. Clients include 
government, agri-industry and farmers (Leeuwis, 2000).    
Operationalizing demand-driven research 
A key element in the shift towards demand-driven research is granting end-users institutional influence 
throughout the research process. According to Röling et al. (2004: 217) these mechanisms are 
effective in the context of industrialized countries: “Farmers in industrial countries have a well 
organized institutional influence on decisions about agricultural research … [and] are perfectly capable 
of telling researchers what they need.” This contrasts with the situation in many developing countries, 
where end-user steering of research planning is insufficiently institutionalized. In the debate on farmer 
involvement in agricultural research, the focus would have shifted too much to participatory methods 
rather than concentrating on the underlying institutional issues (Hall et al., 2001: Hall et al., 2003). 
Following Hall et al.’s pragmatic definition, ‘institutions’ refers to the “combined environment of ‘rules of 
the game’ and physical organizations and the interplay of the two” (Hall et al., 2001: 784). Hall et al. 
(2003) argue that the rules and norms of institutions within innovation systems govern the following 
roles and processes for research:  
- how research priorities emerge, are promoted and executed; 
- the role of various actors involved in the production, transfer and use of knowledge; 
- the relationship between the different actors and the factors that affect their relationships; 
- how research performance is evaluated and rewarded (incentives), and by whom; 
- how research is held accountable to different interest groups and society as a whole; 
- how knowledge is built up, shared and used; and, 
- how organizations reflect and learn. 
As several authors argue (e.g. Clark, 2002; Garforth et al., 2003; Sumberg and Reece, 2004), due to 
several institutional problems an effective match between demand (of farmers, government) and 
supply (of research and advisory services) for innovation support services is sometimes hard to make. 
To facilitate this match, often specialized intermediaries are put in place which act as ‘brokers’ or 
‘boundary organizations’ (see e.g. Cash, 2001; Dalrymple, 2005). Examples are research councils 
(Kassam et al, 2004) or in the case of farmer-funded research there are bodies such as commodity 
boards and producers’ organizations which act as intermediaries (see Brennan and Mullen, 2002). 
There are also specialized advisory organizations which fulfill such a role in matching demand and 
supply (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, in press a). These fulfill a mediating role between the financier, the 
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researchers, the intermediate users (such as extension service providers) and end-users (farmers and 
other agri-food chain actors) who are supposed to benefit from the research.  
The paper analyses two research planning and execution systems which –in theory– have 
institutionalized end-user involvement throughout the process, and aims to signal tensions in the 
operationalization of such demand-driven research planning systems. Elsewhere these system have 
been analyzed separately in more detail (Klerkx and Leeuwis, in press b; in press c), but the aim of 
this paper is to provide a comparative perspective. The principal research question is whether there 
are differences with regard to the degree research is made ‘demand-driven’ between a situation in 
which farmers fund their own research (i.e. using private funds), and when research is funded with 
public funds but farmers are given decision making authority in research planning. The paper 
proceeds by briefly discussing a number of ‘arena’s’ in research planning and execution, followed by a 
description of the two research planning systems and a comparative analysis of the tension 
encountered in the different arena’s. It concludes with a number of policy recommendations.  
Research planning and execution in two systems of contractual 
research planning 
Comparing two research planning systems 
Research planning takes place within several time horizons and at different complexity levels. This 
paper focuses on a lower level of planning, i.e. research project planning. Capo et al. (2001: 119) 
define this as “a systematic and integrated management approach to identifying and preparing a plan 
to resolve a ‘problem’ identified within the broad field of agriculture”.  Several pathways can be taken 
to come to the generation, selection, and execution of research projects, but basic steps in research 
project planning are proposal generation, proposal refining and modification, and project selection for 
funding (Daniel et al., 2003). As several authors argue (Stewart, 1995; Davenport et al, 2003), 
research project planning is the scene of negotiation between different configurations of actors. As 
regards the content of these negotiations, Braun (1998) has identified three arena’s, i.e. the policy 
arena, the selection arena, and the control arena, and relates these to phases in the research 
planning procedure (Braun, 2003). The policy arena is about the fundamental level and long-term time 
horizon. Typical problems that manifest here relate to goal conflicts. The selection arena deals with 
the pre-contract phase (i.e. proposal generation, proposal refining and modification, and project 
selection for funding) and here the adverse selection problem is particularly relevant, which implies 
that actors cannot make a well-informed decision because of overall lack of information or information 
asymmetry. With regard to the execution phase of research, Braun talks about the control arena which 
is about the monitoring of the progress of the research. Typical problem here is moral hazard (being 
sure that researchers do their best to solve the problems and tasks delegated to them and that they 
avoid ‘shirking’ behavior) and adequately monitoring research progress.  
The paper looks at two systems in which users are involved in research planning and execution. One 
is a system of funding of research through compulsory levies imposed on farmers to install ‘contractual 
research planning’: placing significant control of the resources available for financing research in the 
hands of stakeholders, creating the means to exert a demand pull on the system (Stewart, 1995; 
Sperling and Ashby, 2001). Under the farmer levy funding system, it is ‘collective private’ funds 
(contributed by farmers) that are used in this way. Because of the large number of levy payers, 
producers are usually represented through boards with decision-making authority. These boards need 
to be part of strong farmer organizations that can raise commitment to the levies amongst their 
constituencies and effectively represent producers’ interests and negotiate with other stakeholders 
such as government (Sperling and Ashby, 2001). This combination of demand pull and farmer 
representation on research planning boards means that funding research through farmer levies is 
generally considered to be an effective way to institutionalize end-user involvement in research 
planning. 
The other system is a system under which government has delegated responsibility for the allocation 
of public funds to research to a heterogeneous network of societal actors (both public-and private) 
relevant to innovation in a certain area. Several authors stress the importance of engaging in such 
public-private partnerships (see e.g. Hall et al., 2006; Hartwich et al., 2007)   According to Braun 
(2003: 320), when research is governed through systems of delegation to networks, this is “…at least 
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in theory, the most adequate way of dealing with the paradox in science/research policies1: reducing 
the direct influence of the state in funding policies, respect for the independence of scientific 
institutions, fostering of ‘vigorous’ scientific institutions, and a strong commitment of scientists to user 
interests.” Such a system implies that research councils, which often form an intermediary layer 
between government and researchers (e.g. Kassam et al., 2004; Dalrymple, 2006), have to broaden 
their scope towards managing multilateral relationships and develop what Gulbrandsen (2005) calls 
‘innovation agency’.  Such innovation agency fits with current perspectives on the role of research 
within a broader innovation system.  
This paper compares the cases of the Dutch Dairy Commodity board, which represents contractual 
research planning with collective-private funds, and the case of Bioconnect, which represents 
delegation of planning of publicly funded research to a multi stakeholder network.  Both cases have 
been presented separately elsewhere in more detail and we refer to these publications for details on 
the research methods (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, forthcoming a, b). The main difference between the 
two cases lies in the role division that is made in the research planning and execution process, and 
the actors that are included overall.  
Farmer involvement in both systems 
Figure 1 shows this role division for DCB, and figure 2 shows this role division for Bioconnect.  The 
main difference lies in the degree of interactivity in the different steps. 
As figure 1 shows, DCB employs a quite linear ‘pipeline’ system, in which farmers can indicate their 
queries (directly or through representatives) but these queries are then further processed by people 
who have specified roles in the research planning and execution process. As a consequence, in each 
step the institutional background of the actors involved (i.e. norms, values, incentives) determines the 
direction in which the queries are molded.  Since this happens in each step in a quite isolated fashion, 
the end-users cannot exercise a direct influence and as a result the queries may become alienated 
from the problems or challenges they are supposed to address.  Although representatives of farmers 
are involved, these are farmers at policy level (active in the farmers’ organizations) who, despite being 
rooted in the grassroots level, wear ‘policy goggles’ and let themselves being informed by researchers 
and their long-term research program rather than ‘real farmers’ at the grassroots level.  
As figure 2 shows,  the system of delegation to networks in the Bioconnect approach is not like DCB’s 
pipeline approach in which different actors exercise influence at different steps in the  research 
planning and execution process. Here demand articulation, research prioritization, and research 
guidance takes place integrally, and is coordinated and monitored through a single platform (called 
product workgroup – PWG) in which all relevant actor groups are represented, i.e. farmers, agri-chain 
industries (input and processing), civic advocacy groups, researchers, and consultants (i.e. extension 
service providers). These persons are generally not active at a policy level, but are nevertheless 
requested to forward a query that is representative for the broader constituency for which they are 
supposed to speak. The PWG has been delegated decision making authority for the allocation of 
public research funds, as a result of which they are not completely free in their choices: they have to 
remain within thematic frameworks set by government, each with an earmarked budget.  
Both in DCB and Bioconnect research coordinators (called knowledge managers in Bioconnect) have 
a pivotal role as bridges between the different parties involved.  In the context of DCB, research 
coordinators  often act as ‘messengers’ of the policy makers in DCB, and represent DCB’s interest in 
bilateral relationships with researchers.  They hence fulfill a more traditional intermediary role as is 
often attributed to research councils or research coordinators, between the financier of the research 
(i.e. the client) and the executors of the research (the contractor), Within Bioconnect, the knowledge 
managers fulfill a more active facilitator role on the platforms on which multi-actor negotiations takes 
place with regard to research planning and monitoring.  There role is to mediate between the different 
actor groups, i.e. facilitate communication between actors who are driven by different norm, value and 
incentive systems, and generally employ different discourses (i.e. farmers discourse, policy discourse, 
scientific discourse).  
1 Braun (2003:309 ) formulates this as follows “A basic paradox in funding policy is that policymakers want to guarantee 
maximum welfare benefits without violating the independence of scientists and their organisations.” 
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Figure 1. Set up research planning procedure DCB 
Proposal selection phase 
Project execution phase 
Proposal refinement phase 
Proposal generation phase 
DCB R&D coordinators gather queries 
Researchers assess research queries 
and write acceptance/rejection advice
Ad-hoc prioritization committee prioritizes 
queries
DCB R&D coordinators set terms of reference 
Researchers write preliminary proposals  
DCB R&D coordinators give pre-advice 
DFC decides on fund allocation  
Researchers execute research 
Research organizations make results 
available 
Queries forwarded by: 
Individual farmers 
Dutch Farmers’ Organization (LTO) 
Research organizations 
R&D results are made public through 
research reports, articles in farming 
magazines, leaflets, and direct 
communication to intermediary parties 
such as veterinaries and consultants 
(during or after the research) 
Consisting of DFC (Dairy Farmers 
Committee) and LTO representatives  
DFC (Dairy Farmers Committee) 
consists of farmers’ representatives 
Principal prioritization criteria are 
DCB research program, personal and 
constituency interests, prioritization pre-
advice (made by R&D coordinators)
Occasionally guidance committee from DCB 
Sometimes participatory research 
Mostly technical research 
= phase in the research planning and execution process 
= information on a particular step or flow 
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Figure 2. Set up research planning procedure Bioconnect 
The different PWG are managed by a general 
knowledge manager and a cluster manager (for 
the theme-coordinators) 
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Quality:  
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PWG
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- Ministry determines broad themes  for each 
PWG and budget for each theme (ex-ante) 
- Ministry ultimately approves prioritized 
proposals  (ex-post) 
PWG assesses 
proposals and 
monitors research 
progress
Constituencies
are consulted 
for research 
queries and 
receive results 
of ongoing 
projects
Bio-knowledge 
portal / 
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broker 
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Farmer representatives 
Industry representatives 
Research representatives 
Ministry representatives 
Farmers and industry constitute research guidance committees 
Research results and other useful information
Civil society 
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Project proposal generation,  
refinement, and selection;  
project execution phase 
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Both approaches focus on research planning, and on research as a means to bring about innovation. 
From innovation systems theory emerges that several other elements than scientific knowledge are 
needed to bring about innovation (see Smits, 2002; Hall et al., 2006).  However, whereas DCB 
generally focuses on making scientific knowledge available and puts great responsibility with farmers 
for acquiring and implementing this knowledge, Bioconnect takes a more integral view and has 
research guidance committees consisting of users in all research projects and has a unit which aims 
to streamline different sources of information and make these available for farmers by means of a 
single portal.  Furthermore, the interaction between different actors in the PWG enables  
joint learning and facilitates that other factors needed for innovation  (such as consumer demand, a 
joint goal and cooperation of the agri-food chain, enabling infrastructure and legislation) can be 
addressed. The Bioconnect system hence seems to be a more comprehensive system to make 
research demand-driven and to successfully embed research within a broader innovation system.  
Problems in the different arenas of research planning: a 
comparative perspective 
Table 1 sets out the main tensions for both systems in relation to the arenas of research governance 
identified earlier (i.e. the policy arena, selection arena and the control arena). From table 1 emerges, 
that DCB is characterized by an overall lack of interaction in the different arenas, which does not allow 
for any direct negotiation between relevant stakeholders as to the desired research or other activities 
to support innovation. This means that farmers’ preferences are ‘overruled’ at later stages by 
researchers’ preferences and policy makers preferences. In some cases this may well align with 
farmers’ real demands, but it may also be research for which there is no real demand.  In many 
regards, what appears to manifest here is a lack of participation of farmers. Although there is 
interaction with researchers, there is no dialogue in which to come to a joint query which a) addresses 
farmers’ current needs and b) addresses researchers’ interests and incorporates the state of the art in 
research. A salient observation was that, whereas the system is set up to be steered by end-users’ 
needs, these needs are not always welcomed by DCB, since it desires to undertake more vanguard 
types of projects. Despite this being a legitimate stance, no approach has been designed to articulate 
such vanguard projects with end-users and other stakeholders.   What in this sense appears to 
manifest is what Sperling and Ashby (2001: 177) call a ‘reverse participation problem’, arguing that “if 
farmers’ groups fail to consult with researchers when defining their agendas, a research strategy may 
emerge that has limited potential for technological progress, precisely because the subjects selected 
may not be amenable to technical investigation”. 
Furthermore, `DCB appears to have a limited view on innovation, as it sees ‘research’  as ‘innovation’, 
whereas sometimes the solution to farmers’ queries might not be research or research needs to be 
complemented by several other activities. In the case of DCB, due to (historically derived) policy 
choices to focus on research and task divisions in the research planning process, the range of 
solutions to the queries farmers forward is often narrowed down right away to production-technical 
research. Other types of research such as management oriented, social science, and economic 
research seem to be underrepresented. Furthermore, research might not be the most adequate and/or 
desired way of tackling farmers’ queries. This focus is in line with observations by others that often 
innovation is seen to equate to conducting production-technical research projects, whereas innovation 
needs to be seen much more broadly in terms of an interactive design or product development 
process (Leeuwis, 1999; Sumberg and Reece, 2004).  
In line with such an innovation system perspective, in the Bioconnect system a wide range of 
stakeholders is involved to make a contribution in terms of articulating knowledge demands and 
adding knowledge to the process. Furthermore, in contrast with DCB, Bioconnect pays structural 
attention to the dissemination of knowledge generated by research through a central portal, and 
through he different informal networks attached to the different research projects in which farmers 
participate in research guidance committees. Despite the higher degree of structural participation and  
interactivity, there are a number of problems. These concern the operationalization of participation in 
the different arenas. At the policy arena level, a principal tension appears to be that, within a network 
approach, multiple actors need to negotiate an agreed joint goal to forward a shared query to the 
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Table 1. Comparison between DCB and Bioconnect in the three arena’s of research governance 
DCB Bioconnect
Policy arena 
(overall 
goals)
Incoherence between: 
- Farmer goals vs. researcher and policy 
goals  ( ‘real demands’ at grassroots level 
vs. demands as determined by researchers 
and as described in research 
programs/vision documents) 
Incoherence between: 
- Farmer goals vs. agri-chain goals (oriented towards 
farm level production issues v.s oriented towards chain 
level processing/logistic/retail issues) 
- Long- vs. short term (researchers and government think 
with a long term perspective vs. farmers want quick 
results)  
- Sector goals vs. government goals (‘micro-prioritization 
criteria’ of the PWG vs. the ‘macro-prioritization’ of the 
thematic budgets as determined by government) 
Selection 
arena
(priority 
setting)
- Low quality of demand articulation (farmers 
are not involved in demand articulation, and 
their input is deemed insufficient and is 
often overruled by researchers) 
- Pre-selection by researchers based on their 
criteria for relevance (i.e. personal interest, 
gaps in scientific knowledge, well-
articulated queries, strategic [chain level] 
rather than operational  [farm level] issues) 
- Selection by policy makers based on their 
policy goals (long term research program, 
policy program of the farmers’ organization 
to which they belong) 
- Information asymmetry between different actors in the 
network (about the proposals being discussed, as well 
as about their place and role in the network and broader 
Bioconnect system) 
- Role divisions between theme-coordinator and 
knowledge manager are not clear (theme-coordinator 
also mediates between researchers and end-users – 
mere secretarial role for knowledge manager) 
- Formats for proposals need to address different 
demands of different parties (most notably end-users 
who want to be briefly informed vs. government 
demands which emphasize completeness, scientific 
rigor and accountability for spending) 
Control 
arena
(progress 
monitoring)
- Low interaction in the research process, 
both between researchers and end-users 
and between researchers and the financier 
- Generally no active formal link between 
researchers and end-users (although on an 
occasional basis and informal basis this 
exists)
- Formats for monitoring address different demands of 
different parties (most notably end-users who want to be 
briefly informed vs. government demands which 
emphasize completeness, scientific rigor and 
accountability for spending) 
- Output preferences (different demands of e.g. farmers, 
government and researchers themselves with regard 
the goal the output serves [i.e. informing farmers, 
providing accountability for use of public funds, scientific 
publishing]).
researchers. Whereas within a bilateral relationship goal conflicts concern the financiers desired 
trajectory versus researchers’ interests (cf Braun, 2003), in a situation in which there are multilateral 
relationships there is more potential for goal conflicts. At the PWG level, this could be observed in 
several respects: farmer interests versus agri-industry interest, short-term focus versus long-term 
focus, and user interest versus government interest. The first two conflicts could result in users not 
seeing a need to participate because there are no apparent direct private benefits, as was the case 
with industry actors in Bioconnect who found that too much attention was paid to farmer’s problems 
and as can be observed in a call for better remuneration for time invested. The third conflict, perceived 
as an annoyance but a relatively minor problem within Bioconnect, could, however, become a more 
serious problem in a situation in which private interests are less aligned with public interests, i.e. when 
in a system of user demand-driven research within a given framework the micro prioritization criteria of 
users do not correspond with macro priorities of government.  At the selection arena level, the findings 
confirm the observation of Davenport et al (2003: 247) that there is no such a thing as ‘generic users’ 
who “represent all of the facets of their sectors equitably and with equal voice” (see also Sperling and 
Ashby, 2001). It appears difficult to establish a single collective query that satisfies the diverse needs. 
Furthermore, a lack of capacity to act in the network (PWG) due to inadequate competencies of some 
network participants or insufficient involvement of some network participants can hinder effective 
functioning of the PWG’s.  There exists information asymmetry among the different actors, because a 
certain format for proposals is used, which not all actors can understand or which takes too much time 
to read.  As a result, not all actors participate well informed in the discussion. This may lead to a 
situation that some actors can exercise more influence.  In case of Bioconnect, the task of the 
knowledge manager was to act as a facilitator/mediator and mitigate such inequalities, but this was 
hindered because the theme coordinator could better perform such a role because he/she was better 
informed about the topic. This was sometimes perceived as undesired steering, although it was not 
intended that way by theme coordinators. At the control arena level, a similar issue related to different 
information needs emerges. The involvement of different actors that have different needs with regard 
to monitoring output (i.e. for accounting, accountability, information purposes) increases bureaucratic 
requirements as it appears hard to integrate the needs of all principals within a single format. In this 
regard it is an interesting paradox that farmers and industry actors especially complain about 
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formalization of the PWG and an increasing amount of information they need to assess, but that at the 
same time this increases their insights into the process of research agenda setting and execution, 
which results in a call for even more information, which in turn calls for more information processing 
capacities (in terms of competencies and time).  
The Bioconnect case indicates that despite incorporating a strong commitment to users’ interests, 
delegation systems also allow government to continue exercising a great deal of direct influence as it 
determines the macro priorities within which users can maneuver. Furthermore, although researchers 
that are active in the negotiation arenas within such a system may be very committed to user interests, 
this does not mean that their constituencies (i.e. the researchers they manage or represent) act in the 
same way and effectively embed user interests in their research. However, the results suggest that 
introducing a network delegation model can help induce institutional change towards interactive ways 
of working, because interaction of researchers with users is built into the system and is a prerequisite 
for obtaining funding. Despite the initial reluctance of some researchers, it does install a learning 
process in relation to more interactive ways of working.  
Conclusion
From the comparison between the two systems a number of lessons can be drawn. A first lesson is 
that user involvement in research planning can be beneficial, but should be adequately organized. 
This requires considerable input in terms of time and money, as has been earlier note by Sperling and 
Ashby (2001) and Dorward et al. (2003).  Furthermore, participation in formal planning procedures 
requires considerable skills from users, who hence should be trained to act in the different arena’s 
(see also Jacob et al., 2005; Lettl et al., 2007). When users are not sufficiently empowered they 
cannot act as equal partners of researchers, which may downplay their role.   Nonetheless, it should 
be recognized that sometimes users can play a less significant role due to the complexity of some 
problems, and that ‘full participation’ is not always the most suitable strategy (Sumberg et al., 2003). 
This is also not always desired by users. However, users should be well informed about what is going 
on, in reporting formats understandable to them. This draws attention to a second issue, that there are 
several demanding groups in research, with sometimes very contrasting demands. This is the case 
both between different groups (ie. government, users) but also within groups because these  are 
heterogeneous (Davenport et al., 2003). As Sperling and Ashby (2001) noted, it is the task of a 
facilitator to balance the different demands into a mutually acceptable solution.  However, sometimes 
there can be several parties that can fulfill a facilitating task and it is not clear who does what, and with 
what intentions.  
An important finding is that a broad view on innovation should be taken, and that in addition to farmers 
having the means to exercise demand in the economic sense through contractual research planning, 
they must also be enabled to create adequate substantive demand for research and other activities 
that can support farmer innovation. Such substantive demand articulation is about the concretization 
of latent and/or incipient needs to guide knowledge and technology development (Sumberg and 
Reece, 2004). Boon et al. (in press) define it as: “an iterative, inherently creative process in which 
stakeholders try to unravel preferences for and address what they perceive as important 
characteristics of an emerging innovation.” Besides stakeholders being involved to make a 
contribution in terms of articulating knowledge demands and adding knowledge to the process, an 
innovation systems perspective suggests that they should also be involved in joint identification of 
other enabling or constraining factors to innovation and in joint action to capitalize upon possibilities 
and remove impediments that may be, e.g., of a legislative, infrastructural, policy, and cultural nature 
(cf. Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
Institutional learning and change would therefore be needed. Often, focus is on institutional learning 
and change in (public) research establishments (e.g. Hall et al., 2003; Gandarillas et al., 2007). These 
should evolve from a linear, supply-driven model of innovation to a demand-driven innovation systems 
model. DCB and Bioconnect employ certain institutional arrangements that supposedly make research 
demand-driven: research is funded with farmer levies or farmers are otherwise granted decision 
making authority, research prioritization and decision making on fund allocation is governed by a 
farmers’ representatives, and privatized research providers are contracted, all of which should 
enhance client-orientation. However, as this paper has shown, these institutional arrangements do not 
automatically successfully grant end-users and other relevant stakeholders real participation and 
control in innovation processes. Institutional structures may not allow the full operationalization of 
demand-driven innovation, as the case of DCB shows, or there is a need for considerable finetuning of 
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the process because different actor groups have different requirements as regards demand 
articulation, prioritization, and progress monitoring as the case of Bioconnect shows.   Whereas the 
case of DCB shows a situation in which such institutional change has yet to be undergone, the case of 
Bioconnect shows a system in which operationalization of demand-driven innovation has been better 
developed. However, this case shows that this is an ongoing learning process. For this matter, it does 
not appear to make a difference whether a system is publicly or privately funded: it matters that the 
participatory process is well organized and the institutional context is receptive to such a process.  
In a system in which a financier (either private or public) can exercise great influence on the way 
research is executed, and can make research establishments more responsive to the needs of end-
users, the financier itself has to be sufficiently responsive to the needs of end-users. Ensuring that 
end-user demand steering is fully operationalized in the research planning procedure would require, 
above all, institutional learning and change within the funding organization (i.e commodity boards or 
government). Furthermore, following Hall (2005), organizations that govern research need to reflect on 
whether they should shift from developing science and technology capacity, to innovation capacity. In 
such a context, these organizations would have, besides their role as research coordinators and 
commissioners, a role of facilitators who match demand and supply for innovation support services 
(see Klerkx and Leeuwis, in press a). This would imply a change of scope in respect of innovation, of 
mandate, and of capacities. 
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